Punishment beyond the retributive logic: aims, limits, and social costs
By Lorenzo Bona
“[Punishment] can, in principle, be made instrumental to objectives of retribution, social control, and education. [...] It is normally assumed that the sole frame of reference for punishment (and the sole objective to which punishment can be made instrumental) is the principle of retribution. [...] If punishment is not strictly related to the specific objectives for which it should be used, serious social harm results: learning processes are impaired, the personality of the person being punished (and of the person administering the punishment) is altered (also causing significant pathological effects), social interaction takes on a conflictual character, and disruptive emotional factors are elicited.”
Giulio Bolacchi, Il sequestro come fatto sociale
Free translation from the Italian
“[La punizione] può essere resa strumentale, in linea di principio, a obiettivi di contrappasso, a obiettivi di controllo sociale e a obiettivi educativi. [...] [N]ormalmente si assume che l’unico quadro di riferimento della punizione (e l’unico obiettivo al quale la punizione possa essere resa strumentale) sia il principio del contrappasso [...] Se la punizione non è strettamente rapportata agli specifici obiettivi per cui dovrebbe essere usata, si producono gravi danni sociali: i processi di apprendimento vengono compromessi, la personalità del punito (e di chi punisce) viene alterata (determinando anche effetti patologici rilevanti), l’interazione sociale si manifesta in termini conflittuali, vengono elicitati fattori emotivi di disturbo”.
Giulio Bolacchi, Il sequestro come fatto sociale, Editrice Dattena, 1998, pp. 194-195.
Introduction
If we look at the world around us today, we see rising tensions: geopolitical conflict, widespread social unrest, and various other forms of violence. These crises inevitably reignite a fundamental debate: how should societies respond to individuals or groups whose behavior deviates, to varying degrees, from the rules designed to maintain social cooperation?
Faced with increasing friction, the standard responses seem, in large part, to remain remarkably unchanged: a renewed reliance on coercion, stricter enforcement, and intensified punishment.
In light of this recurring pattern, it may be helpful to revisit some insights of Giulio Bolacchi (1926–2020), an Italian scholar – whom I was fortunate to have as a teacher during my postgraduate studies – whose work largely focused, in broadly pioneering ways, on the intricate intersections between sociology, psychology, and economics.
Rather than offering rigid prescriptions, Bolacchi’s theoretical framework suggests the need to re-examine what could appear to be our default assumptions about social control – and whether our reliance on traditional forms of punishment is as effective or self-evident as we tend to assume.
Questioning the Three Pillars of Punishment
In his book Il sequestro come fatto sociale (which could be freely translated as Kidnapping as a Social Fact), Bolacchi invites us to examine how punishment appears to be often invoked without explicitly defining the objectives to which it is made instrumental – failing to differentiate retribution, education, and social control, and risking a slide back toward a purely retributive logic.
The Retributive Principle (Contrappasso)
Bolacchi’s perspective on contrappasso – understood here as a retributive principle based on the correspondence between wrongdoing and punishment – may lead us to ask a series of questions. For example, is it possible that modern societies still place retribution close to what could appear as a moral pedestal? Is it possible that our societies still tend to treat the infliction of more or less proportionate cost or suffering as an almost unquestionable requirement of justice, even when its contribution to prevention or behavioral change remains uncertain?
This tension seems to be particularly visible in debates over extreme sanctions such as capital punishment. When a system resorts to the ultimate penalty, is it relying on an effective mechanism of social regulation, or perhaps assuming that the infliction of harm is itself a sufficient response to harm?
Setting aside moral and ethical considerations, from a behavioral and, more broadly, socio-economic perspective, we might also ask: does this approach genuinely promote social progress?
The point is not simply whether a person deserves to be punished for behavior incompatible with organizational rules. It is also important to examine what social function punishment performs – and whether the reasons used to justify it are supported by evidence that it achieves its intended purpose.
The Limits of Educational Claims
With inevitable simplification, Bolacchi’s research invites us to question whether a sanction applied after the fact can genuinely educate. Does a delayed punishment truly teach an individual why a cooperative rule matters? Or does it merely alter the immediate costs of breaking a rule, without producing lasting changes in the interests and behavioral processes that led to that behavior?
His research tends to reflect the idea that under certain conditions, relying on punishment to educate may simply encourage greater concealment or more effective rule avoidance.
In this sense, a deeper question that his studies seem to raise is whether we can assume that genuine learning follows automatically from the imposition of pain or costs – or whether fostering true alignment with cooperative rules requires mechanisms entirely distinct from the traditional, common-sense concept of punishment.
The Limits of General Deterrence as a Form of Social Control
The use of various forms of punishment appears to be frequently justified on the idea that they deter potential future rule-breakers.
Bolacchi invites us to examine this idea in terms of behavioral mechanisms and reflect on a fundamental question: can a delayed and uncertain punishment genuinely alter behavior when immediate economic or social interests are particularly strong?
Following his behavioral logic and theoretical approach, deviant behavior – that is, behavior divergent from a given set of organizational rules – may occur when the interest motivating it outweighs the countervailing interest in avoiding the threatened sanction. In such circumstances, the threat has failed to interrupt the behavioral sequence that resulted in behavior contrary to organizational rules.
This raises another essential question: if a sanction fails to prevent deviant behavior, what can we infer about its ability to prevent similar acts in the future?
Bolacchi – in a necessarily simplified reconstruction of his line of reasoning – argues that when a given form of punishment fails to interrupt the instrumental processes underlying deviant behavior, that same form of punishment is likely to fail under equivalent conditions in the future as well. The failure is therefore more than an isolated outcome: it suggests that the sanction has not effectively interrupted the behavioral processes that result in behavior contrary to organizational rules.
This argument requires an important qualification. It concerns situations equivalent in the relevant behavioral respects, not every possible future situation. Different individuals, interests, expectations, and circumstances may lead people to respond differently to the same threat. Nevertheless, Bolacchi’s central challenge remains: why should the effectiveness of punishment be presumed when the conditions necessary for its effectiveness have not been established?
Here, Bolacchi’s research invites us to consider a fundamental tension inherent in the social function of punishment. The logic he develops addressing this problem could be summarized as follows: when a sanction fails to prevent deviant behavior, the punishment may still be imposed – not because it can undo the behavior that has already occurred, but because its application is intended to preserve the credibility of the announced threat and deter potential future deviations from social rules.
The punishment cannot prevent the rule-breaking that has already occurred, yet its application is justified partly by its intended effect on others who might break the rules in the future.
But this justification – as Bolacchi emphasizes – raises a paradoxical question: if the same sanction is unlikely to prevent similar behavior under equivalent conditions, how can reaffirming the credibility of the threat be expected to overcome the interests and behavioral processes that made it ineffective in the first place?
The credibility of a threat and its actual deterrent effectiveness are not necessarily the same thing. A punishment may communicate that a rule will be enforced without demonstrating that the threat will successfully change behavior.
The tension, then, is not simply that punishment has failed once. As Bolacchi stresses, it is that organizations may respond to this failure by reaffirming the same deterrent mechanism without establishing whether it can work under the conditions that produced the deviation from the prevailing organizational rules.
Toward an Intelligent Social Design
Bolacchi’s perspective does not demand ideological alignment; it offers a framework for critically examining our assumptions about social control.
As Bolacchi observed, replacing deeply entrenched institutional habits is far from easy. Yet, the ongoing debates surrounding rehabilitation and educational reform may reveal an important historical shift: a gradual cultural shift away from the ideology of contrappasso (retribution for its own sake). Modern societies are increasingly uncomfortable with the idea that inflicting suffering is, by itself, a sufficient answer to harm.
This shift invites us to consider whether a hasty reliance on punishment that has not been fully examined may inadvertently act as a reflex reaction that risks precluding or interfering with a more systematic understanding of human behavior and social cooperation.
If our goal is to foster lasting cooperation and minimize harmful behavior, can we afford to keep escalating punitive measures without examining the conditions that that give rise to and sustain sustain such behavior?
Or should we begin to ask ourselves more carefully whether social stability may depend not only on the threat of sanctions, but also on designing environments in which constructive, cooperative behavior becomes a more rational and sustainable choice?
This does not mean abandoning punishment altogether. It means moving beyond the widespread tendency to treat sanctions grounded in retributive principles as the default response, and asking whether lasting social stability depends far more on building conditions where cooperation is not merely demanded, but perhaps more actively and responsibly fostered through innovative approaches informed by the scientific analysis of human behavior.